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I.

Introduction
The difficult task we have set for ourselves in this paper is to

attempt to illuminate the relationship among science, technology and
development, using the experience of seven countries of widely differ
ent characteristics and operating at different.stage s of development
as building blocks. 1 the issues to be addressed are inherently com
plicated.

Relevant theory is, by general consensus, still in its

infancy and modest step-by-step empirical approaches consequently
cannot help us very much.

This is also an area of major discontinuities

in behavior, always more difficult for scientists to handle, and one
in which the temptation to perceive all dimensions of human progress
as relevant is both natural and bound to lead us in too many directions
at once.
Nevertheless, the effort should be made--not only to attempt to
improve our basic understanding of how we got here, and why, but also
because the distillation of such an improved understanding may hold
some lessons for the future, especially with respect to the achievement
of modern growth on the part of contemporary developing countries.

*The author wishes to ~cknowledge the assistance of H.T.C. Hu and
the comments of Bill Beranek.
~ile in this sense this paper attempts, inter alia, to "synthesize"
the work of others, they are not to be held responsible for the inter
pretations made, conclusions drawn, and errors committed here.
**This is a revised version of a paper presented at
Academy of Sciences Bicentennial Symposium on "Science:
Humankind," September, 1976.
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The problems and aspirations of that two-thirds of humanity which does
not yet enjoy modern growth, but is anxious to achieve it~-while deeply
puzzled as to the proper role of science and technology- -represent our
main concern.
The very nature of this effort, necessarily eclectic

and tour

d'ho:rizon in character, means that we should not ·expect to find a new,
definitive set of answers to these old and perplexing problems.

It

also means that the temptation to force observation s into c·onsistency
with some premature unifying theme or preconceive d theoretical mold
must be resisted.

All 'we can and have tried to do is, by selectively

organizing the information arid insights gathered by all the participant s,
to improve soinewhat our understandi ng of these complicated inter
relationshi ps and ·point the direction 'which further, more original and
basic, ~alysis might well talce.

If, in spite of ourselves, we seem

at times to have reached out in search of some broader explanatory
framework, it is with.the understandi ng that the improvement , or even
the reasoned rejection of such a _framework, by others, will serve to
advance the common cause.
.

.

.

Tlie'approac h of this paper is frankly historical, focussing mainly
on the 18th and.19th century experience of the.now advanced and the
more recent experience of the currently developing countries.

This is

because we believe that history indeed represents the most important
and as yet most underutiliz ed laboratory for the exploration of these
issues.
We recognize, moreover, at this most general level, that while

-3all societies, historical and contemporary, share the tyranny of their
initial endowments,they face substantial alternatives with respect to
their objectives and the way in which they decide to organize themselves.
To keep the scope of this paper from becoming entirely unmanageable, we
shall not concern ourselves very much with a comparative evaluation of
organizational systems.

We shall assume, especially when dealing with

contemporary developing countries, that they are of the mixed, non
socialist variety.

Moreover, and not unrelated, we shall not be concerned

with possible inter-country differences in social objectives.

Instead,

we shall assume that all societies may be located on some more or less
continuous spectrum of institutional choice and that the "old-fashioned "
development objective, sustained increases in per capita

income,

either is shared by all, or, and more s~tisfactory, is not in necessary
conflict with such other valid non-traditiona l concerns as distribution
and employment.
In order to avoid a veritable parade of definitions, we shall equate
"social and economic development" ~th per capita income growth; by
"science" we shall mean the accumulation of basic systematic knowledge
about the natural universe around us; and by "technology",th e application
of such knowledge to the construction of a pool of ideas useful in the
production of goods and services.

Neither with respect to science or

technology will we entertain the plausible notion that such activities
may

represent some sort of valid type of art form carrying its own

cultural, esthetic or consumption values.

While we recognize that the

relationships among "science," "technology" and "development" as defined

-4here may be indirect, lagged, multidimensional, uncertain and, above all,
complicated, it is these relationships we shall be mainly concerned with.
Our country sample includes Great Britain, the acknowledged historical
leader in the transition to modern growth; Germany and the United States,
two early followers; Japan and Hungary, two relatively late followers;
and, finally, Brazil and Ghana, two contemporary developing economies.
We will first (Section II) try to define more precisely the issues
on which this set of papers 1s attempting to shed some light.

We will

then review the relevant evidence from the historical experience of the
now mature early developers (Section III), of the late followers
(Section IV) and of the currently developing economies (Section V).

Our

findings and conclusions are summarized in(Section VI).

II.

Some of the Issues
Most scientists, whether natural or social, and most officials,

whether from developed (DC) or less developed (LDC) cowitries,share
the general conviction tnat there· indeed exist strong relationships
among the three variables, science, technology and development, with
which we are concerned.

There is, however, considerably less under

standing, hence agreement, on the precise nature of these relation
ships or even on the direction of the causal order.

Consequently,

with underlying behavior not well understood, it is natural that there
should exist a good deal of uncertainty with respect to what constitutes
appropriate government policy in support of a society's basic develop
mental objective.
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The·relat ively "easier" part of the puzzle is undoubted ly that
which focusses on the relations hip between technolog y and developme nt.
A substanti al amount of work, both theoretic al and empirica l, has been
done in this area, mainly by economis ts.

This work has permitted us

to conclude fairly unambiguo usly that the associati on between technolog y
and growth is indeed strong, i.e., that it is changes in the quality
of a society's processes and goods which are highly associate d with
economic growth.

The precise character of the technolog ical change

associate d with growth remains a ''measure of our· igno.rance "; we do not
know whether it is manna from heaven (what the economis ts call "disem
bodied" and "exogenou s") or whether it results from R & D embodied in
people or machines.

The increased physical availabi lity and applica

tion of homogeneous factors, i.e., "more of the same", in the absence
of technolog y change, probably accounts for only a small portion, perhaps
as little as 20%, of total growth in most of the advanced non--soci alist
countries .

As Kuznets puts it, even when we acknowled ge that new tech

nology may have negative as well as positive impacts on society-- including
additiona l social costs and discomfo rts--"the nettest definitio n •••would
still show a rapid increase [of income] per head, against fewer working
hours. 112
Most aggregati ve studies-- a la Solow, Kendrick and Denison- -assign
the label "technolo gy change" to everythin g which cannot be explained
via an augmenta tion of enwnerate d physical inputs.

However, the strength

of particula r micro-ass ociations and the all-impor tant "richer" issue

2

.

S. Kuznets, "Technolo gical Innovatio ns and Economic Growth," p. 30,
to be published , M. Kranzberg , editor.

-6-

of what causes technology change endogenously brings us, even here, onto
shakier ground.
R

&

Cross-country studies trying to relate expenditures on

.D (as a percent of GNP) to growth in productivity, for example by

the OECD, have come up empty. 3
chain is reversed:
R

&

It is just as likely that the major causal

More growth, hence affluence, may simple permit more

D to be carried out.

In other words, while we are fairly sure about

the causal i~portance of technology change for growth, we do not as yet.
understand the anatomy of technology change well enough t~ know how to,
affect its strength or character with any degree of precision.
A large part of this problem is that our understanding of the rela
tionship between science and the other two members of our basic triplet
is even more precarious--esp ecially as far. as .· the LDC' s are concerned.
What we do have is an act of faith on the part of some that science must
precede technology, which causes growth.

Others see relatively little

evidence of~ necessary causal relationship between science and technology,
at least for any given country, and, rather, view science as something
,only rich countries should be able to afford,whil~ poor ones borrow.
Such extreme points of view naturally
as t~ policy.

lead to equally extreme positions

On one side are those who would advise LDC's,for example,

to acquire and maintain frontier capacity in every major field of science
in order to be able to participate fully in the benefits of technology
change.

On the other are those who would counsel LDC's to let the DC's

spen.d their relatively ample resources, on basic sci.ence, and then pick
and choose only "appropriate" areas of .science, if necessary, along with

3

see The Conditions. for Success in Technological Innovation, OECD,
Paris, 1974.

-7only "appropriat e" types of technology, if possible, from the "free"
internation al shelf of human knowledge.

Undoubtedly , the truth lies

somewhere in between.
Thirdly, the notion of "appropriat eness" itself, whether with re
spect to science or technology, if it has validity, must be relatable
to national endowments or capacities, even if these are interpreted from
a dynamic and long-term perspective .
example,

Just as the product cycle, for

seems to hold certain useful notions as to the path of product

and technology mixes across countries at different levels of developmen t,
is there a valid analogy in science?

Do different

resource endowments

really induce different types or directions, as opposed to simply
different quantitites , of technology change?

Again, is anything analo

gous]yvalid in the field of science?
Fourthly, and closely related to what has gone before, of course,
is the issue of the potential role of government in strengthenin g both
the links between technology and growth and between science and tech
nology.

This, of course, depends in large part on the illuminatio n of

the basic behavioral relationshi ps which will hopefully result from
our effort at rummaging through the various available historical labora
tories, particularl y with respect to such issues as the relative appro
priability or inappropria bility of new scientific and/or technologic al
know-how and its relation to the perfection or imperfectio n of goods and
information markets.
Finally--an d "finally" only_ because we must necessarily exercise
some self-restra int with respect to the number of difficult issues we
can even touch upon within the confines of this paper~-is the question
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of whether, whatever relationshi ps existed between science, technology
and development in the 18th and 19th c~nturies, these relationshi ps
have become fundamental ly altered in character in the 20th.

Here

there are at least two major viewpoints in evidence in the literature:
one,that technology used to be empirically based but is now science
based; the other, that technology has always been, and continues to
be, science-bas ed, except that science is now "bigger" and the gap
between it and technology smaller.
The Early Developers:

III.

Great Britain, Germany and the United States

It is generally accepted that Great Britain was the world's leader
in both technology and growth in the 18th and early 19th centuries,
followed, in the first instance, by France and Germany on the Continent,
and then by the United States in the "overseas territories ."

There

appears to be substantial agreement as to the factors to which Great
Britain owed her original position of preeminence , but less on why it
failed to persist, and least on the relationshi p all of this had, if
any, to the role of science.
The so-called Industrial Revolution, associated with the substi
tution of machines and inanimate power for labor power came first to
Great Britain.

This is frequently atttibuted, 4 among other factors,

to her relatively higher level

and better distributio n of income,

hence broader base of purchasing power; her favorable geographic
position associated with both greater immunity from war and greater

.

4

.

E.g. , see David S. Landes; The Utibciutid Prometheus, C~bridge
University Press, 1972. ·
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access to less troublesome trading partners; her relatively better
endowment in natural resources, especially coal; but, most of all,
her relatively greater progress in throwing off internal feudalistic
and mercantilist interferences.

Thus, while all of Western Europe

was undergoing significant long-term change associated with urbani
zation, nationalism and the generally enhanced application of reason
to assist man to better manipulate his environment, Great Britain
emerged with a clear lead in textiles, as well as in the machinery
industry to which impovements in textiles gave rise, until the middle
of the 19th century.
Yet, in spite of all efforts to keep advances in technology
"bottled up" on the British islands--by prohibiting the export of
workers before 1825 and of machinery before 1842--by the time
of the Crystal Palace Exhibition in 1851 there were clear indications
that the Continent, especially Germany, was taking the lead in the
important chemical, pharmaceutical and electrical engineering indus
tries, with the United States :forging ahead in mechanical engineering.

By the time of World War I, as Cardwell points out, Britain had become
an importer of skilled labor and technology.

Explaining the more

controversial "why" of this change in leadership position in techno,1.ogy
and growth is interesting not only for its own sake but also because
it may help us to understand better their mutual relationship to
science.
Cardwell attributes the decline of British leadership largely to
the fact that British technology was substantially "empirically-based"
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rather than "science-based. "

Such a distinction between technology

which arises from trial and error manipulations of the environment
rather than from c;.1-janges in our basic comprehension of the laws
governing that environment is also made by Rosenberg and others.

The

British early lead, according to this.view, was based on such industries
as textiles, metals and brewing which developed on the basis of
"tinkering" rather than new scientific insights.

Even the smelting

of iron ore was presumably carried out without knowledge of the
chemistry of oxidation or reduction.
According to this view, one of the principal reasons for Britain's
later relative decline is the fact that empirically-bas ed technology
change--:even if sustained for a time by sequential or "neighboring"
problem-solving innovations 5--ultimately is not sustainable, if
·not replenished by basic scientific advances.

Cardwell sees British

science in a long post-Newtonian decline, with pronounced neglect of
scientific education, at the very time .the ,country is leading in steam
power, textiles, an~ metallurgy.

At. the same time the Empire is

sipho~ing off energies and capit&Land Briti~h entrepreneurs are
becoming. "fat" and more interested in the gentlemanly life than the
improvement of their mills and factories.

When, this is placed in.·

~he context of an incre;:isingly strong nationalistic response to the
"British challenge," on the Continent, in the form of greater emphasis
on science and on science-based education, the loss of leadership in
"science-based " i,ndustries to France and, especially, to Germany, can

5

As so thoroughly documented by A.P. Usler The History of
Mechanical Inventions, (New York: McGraw Hill Book Go., Inc., 1929).
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be explained.

The French Ecole Polytechnique had no equivalent in

BI'itain, while the somewhat more pragmatically oriented post-Liebig
research labs and engineering schools helped Germany to outdistance
everyone in the chemical/pharmaceutic al, iron and steel and electrical
machinery industries by the end of the 19th century.
An explanation of Britain's relative decline based heavily on her

failure to perceive the existence of a direct causal link between
basic science and technology does not, however, se?'ve us very well when
we examine the relative success of the U.S. experience beginning in
the last half of the 19th century.

The base for U.S. technology

change and its associated growth pattern was clearly "empirical" as
well, in the sense that the U.S. exploitation of the idea of mass pro
duction with

interchangeable parts,which gave it a commanding lead in

the mechanical engineering industries,can also be said to have emerged
from trial and error on top of largely imported technology.

Rosenberg

sees the Americans borrowing "freel.y and extensively from Europe,"
with very little "genuinely inyentive activity" in evidence during the
colonial period.

There was little government support of science.

Be

ginning around 1850, nevertheless, the U.S. began to innovate .mean"'."
ingfully in the area of production engineering and the application of
improved mechanical skills; the McCormack reaper, the Colt .45,. the
cotton gin and the typewriter were among the products which revolutionized
in a rather fundamental way factory production methods generally.
While putting out and handicraft production persisted in Europe, the
U. S., as Cardwell and Rosenberg agree, quickly became the tmdisputed
leader in industries which lent themselves to the introduction of
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labor-s aving machin ery for the mass produc tion of a standa rdized
produc t.

Before World War I, Singer Sewing establi shed a subsid iary

outside Glasgow said to be the "most advance d" in Britain , if not

in Europe .

None of the indust ries in which the U. S. began to set the

innova tive pace can be said to be "scienc e- based,"

certain ly not

in contra st with the indust ries in which Germany assumed the lead.
A somewhat differe nt explan ation of why Britai n's leaders hip
role was gradua lly eclipse d may simulta neousl y provide us with an
approac h to a better µnders tanding of the relatio nship betwee n
scienc e, technol ogy and growth .

This explan ation would essent ially

start by rejecti ng the notion that any sustain ed technol ogy change
can really be "empir ically- based" as opposed to "scienc e-base d."
There clearly exist marked , and import ant, differe nces in the direct 
ness of the link, from either the physic al or tempor al points of view.
But we find it difficu lt to accept the notion that British techno logical
advance s. in textile s and metallu rgy were not firmly based on steam
power or that the steam engine .in turn. was not based on prior basic
advanc es in man's unders tanding of physic s. 6 Even if Watt's steam
engine can be relegat ed (as Cardwe ll does) to the realm of an
"isola ted excepti on"--w hich we doubt- -it is a most import ant one.
And there were others .

For techno logy change to occur, someth ing

has tobe "in the air" in the form of recent , or past, improv ements
in our basic unders tanding of the univers e-~eve n if the innova tor
himsel f is not a scient ist workin g in a labora tory.

6

Arkwri ght's

First pointed out to me by Simon Kuznet s in private corresp ondenc e.
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water frame (1769) is viewed as "wholly barren of science" by
Cardwell, yet the fact that h~ was previousl y an apprentic e to a
barber and a wigmaker does not mean the invention was not based on

previousl y acquired science.

As Cardwell puts it, "if [such innova

tions] have scientifi c content ••• it is so well known that it can be
taken as common knowledge ."

But that is just the point.

the idea utilized has not recently sprung from the garret
research lab

of some scientist

Just because
or the

does not make it any less science-b ased.

This is, of course, not to say that we cannot, or indeed should
not, distingui sh between relativel y major or epochal types of technology change and relativel y minor, successor (or adaptive) types. 7
The former may be more obviously and directly science-r elated, e.g. ,
a new

hybrid seed and Mendelian laws,or plastics and molecular

chemistry ; but the new combinati ons of fertilize r and water required
to render the new seeds most effective , and the new industria l appli
cations of plastic materials , are surely just as much related to
science as the initial major technical advance.
Closely related to this question, and thus perhaps shedding
additiona l light on it, is the possibili ty of a "reverse" causal
ordering, running from technolog y change to scientifi c progress.

As

both Banal and Kuznets have pointed out, 8 science is likely to be
stimulate d by new data, new tools and new "puzzles" which emerge in
the course of the applicati on and modificat ion of technolog y.

Thus,

7cardwell himself
contrasts "revoluti onary invention s and evolu
tionary improvem ents."
8

S. Kuznets, op. cit.

-14the origina l smelting of iron may have (as already mention ed) proceede d
without full understa nding of the chemistr y of oxidatio n or reductio n.
Yet the fact that the Besseme r process initiall y worked in England
but not on the Contine nt (where the iron ore had a higher phospho rus
content ) led to new scienti fic inquirie s into basic metallur gy and,
in turn, to the improved Thomas -Gilchri st steel-ma king process .
Similar ly, the difficu lties encount ered in the transpla nting of
improved seeds from one country to another have led to substan tial
new breakthr oughs in agricul tural chemist ry.
It may therefor e be useful to think of science and technolo gy as
more of a closed mutually reinforc ing and mutually depende nt circle-
and for both scienti fic and technol ogical advances to be viewed as
moving points on a spectrum , some indicati ng major cataclys mic or
epochal "jumps," others less spectac ular advances in understa nding
and accompl ishment.

Does such a notion almost serve to oblitera te

the differen ce between the concept s of "science " and "technol ogy"?
We do not think so; the definiti ons previou sly adopted stand up rather
well.

What it does do is cast doubt on the usefulne ss of the distinc 

tion between ·11 science- based" and "empiri cally-ba sed" technolo gy change.
It might perhaps be more useful to speak rather in terms of "scienc e
intehsiv e" versus "engine ering-in tensive" technolo gy change along
that spectrum .

This might help us to distingu ish between what was

happenin g during the last half of the nineteen th century in the
chemica l/pharm aceutica l industr ies of Germany and in a number of the
intercha ngeable parts/ma chine technolo gy dominate d industr ies in the
United States.

-15But where does this leave us with respect to our search for an
"explanatio n" of why Britain lost her lead in the "science-in tensive"
industries to Germany and her lead in the "engineerin g-intensive "
industries to the

u.

S.?

It is perhaps more useful to seek such an

explanation in the realm of the changing impact of differences in the
endowment and in public policy over time.
Britain's early leadership position w~s, as we have already noted,
closely tied to her relatively abundant natural resources, in particular
coal and iron ore, as well as to the relatively more pronounced
laissez faire position of her government --guaranteei ng not only non
interventio n at home but market access abroad.

It is plausible to

argue that some of these advantages turned to disadvantag es later on.
Let us begin with natural resources.

There is little doubt that

Britain's advantage in coal, iron and geography heavily contributed
to the smugness and loss of entrepreneu rial energy previously noted.
But it also meant that the Continent, especially Germany, felt under
great pressure to catch up.

Even after the exploitatio n of the Ruhr's

. coal deposits began in earnest, fuel costs remained higher on the Con
tinent.

The same was true for iron ore.

Consequent ly,"continen tal

irorunasters were making more of their resources than their competitors
across the Channel; and since fuel economy was the key to efficiency
in almost every stage of manufacture , the tentative advances of the
1830's and 1840's were the starting point of. a scientific metallurgy
that was to pay off in major improvement s a generation later." 9 There
can be little doubt that Germany's spectacular success in the science-

9

D. S. Landes, op. cit., p. 181.
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intensive chemical industry was very much related to a strong national
istic drive aimed at finding substitut es for her deficienc ies in natural
resources at home and colonies abroad.
With respect to the United States, that country could increasin gly
take advantage of her relativel y much more abundant wood supply to man
ufacture lighter textile and other machinery .

Such machinery was first

considere d an amusing oddity, but later generally recognize d as techni
cally superior.

The relative abundance of her natural resources base

also gave her the continuin g advantage of a cheaper supply of fuel,
first based on steam, then, built on the scientifi c advances made else
where in the field of induction , on electric power.

Moreover, her

labor shortage removed most institutio nal (e.g., Luddite), as well as
economic, obstacles to a thorough- going exploitat ion of labor-sav ing
technolog ical opportun ities.

From textiles to metallurg y and to the

many later applicatio ns of machine-m aking in routinize d mass productio n
industrie s, the response to changes in the environme nt was usually
rapid.

Rosenberg points out that as the comparati ve advantage in

cheap wood later dwindled, we find iron replacing wood, and coal and
coke replacing charcoal as the primary source of fue.1.

The rapid over

all pace of industria lization was also accompani ed by increasin g
capital intensity and associate d scales.

Increasin g pressure for

labor-sav ing technolog y in industry, together with the existence of
·a large, dependabl e and expanding domestic market, propelled by the
expansion of the railroad, provided the cornersto ne for the "American
System" of mass productio n. 10

10 see also H. J; Habbakuk, American and
British Technolo
in the
19th Century (Cambridge Universit y Press, 1962 , for a detailed U.S./
U.K. compariso n.

-17In U.

s.

agriculture , the favorable man/land ratio led to a

mechanizati on trend, initially of the horse-drawn variety, later of
the tractor type--both labor-savin g and land-using in character.
The application of what Hayami and Ruttan have called the biological/
chemical kind of technology change did not seriously come into its own
until after the closing of the frontier (circa 1890) seemed to make
such increased reliance on the resource-sa ving effects of science
rather more warranted.
But the patterns which evolved in Britain, the Continent and the
United States over time were due as well to government policies which
acted either to facilitate or to obstruct the system's above-descr ibed
accommodat ions to its changing relative endowments and capacities.
With respect to Britain, for example, a policy of substantial laissez
faire which had been a liberating advantage in the 18th and early 19th
centuries vis-a-vis the more mercantilis t and still somewhat feudalistic
countries of Europe may have become a handicap later on.
education continued to enjoy

a relatively

When technical

low prestige and, as Cardwell

puts it, the Indian Civil Service Exam drew more attention than the Cam
bridge Mathematics Tripos, the government, instead of leaning against
this wind, chose to stand aside.

With supremacy already having been

a~hieved in textiles and metallurgy and colonial markets safely pro
tected, it did not feel the need to encourage scienfific research or
education.

Delegations of businessmen visiting the U.S. in the 1850's

could not convince the establishme nt at home that anything was amiss.
It took World War I to bring a sharp realization of the extent to
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which Britain had become dependent on German science and science
education and on U.S. machinery engineering accomplishm ents.
only then that (belated) government action was taken.

It was

Cardwell, in

fact, notes that even to this day, in spite of the new universitie s
of the post-War era and the increase in defense-rel ated R & D, Britain
still finds herself in something of a "technology trap," with higher
· technical education something of a step-child and routinized R

&

D

not yet a major management tool.
Nineteenth century Germany, on the other hand, represented , as
Fischer puts it, a case of "Smithian liberalism tamed by enlightened
governmenta lism." Spurred by the threat of British economic hegemony
as well as by competition among the various German states, these
governments generally did not question their responsibil ity to
help--eithe r via protective tariffs, as in the case of the rise of the
important beet sugar industry, or via the support of scientific research
labs and scientific education-- as in the case of the von Humboldt
reforms.

Prussia went so far.as to set up costly state enterprises

and to issue invitations to moneyed private parties to establish
factories; but mostly, in contrast to the heavy intervention ism of
the French, the German effort was
expositions , awards, subsidies,

a more

indirect one, e.g., via

technical advice, and the estab-

lishment of a whole network of technical and scientific institution s
at various levels, to provide formal training, from engineers and
mechanics to manual arts and design.

German government assi$tance to

-19the institutionalization of private credit and the provision of
public overheads, via the Credit Mobilier type of mechanism, compared
increasingly favorably with the inadequacies of the British private
market for venture capital.
Even with respect to the acquisition of general cognitive skills
by the population as a whole, Britain remained elitist and indifferent
by contrast.

In 1860, for example, only 50% of British school-aged

children attended elementary schools; in Germany, as a consequence of
compulsory education laws, the equivalent figure was more than 97%.
This is in addition to a longer period of schooling and a quality
differential in favor of Germany.

As Landes put :i.t, "once science

began to anticipate technique--and it was already doing so to some
extent in the l850's--formal education became a major industrial
resource.

1111

While the :British turned to enjciy their successes of

the past in a gentlemanly fashion, exhibiting an increasing disdain
for the (underpaid) scientist and the technically educated , German
princes vied with each other in founding technical schools and
research institutes as well as becoming the patrons of individual
scientists.
The role of government in the United States, while clearly more
limited than in Continental Europe, also served to facilitate the
system's path in the directions indicated.
on the growth of the multi-faceted U.

s.

Rosenberg, in commenting

machinery industry, speaks

of a surprising volume of public/private collaboration in "visiting
one another's plants, sharing new technological knowledge and even

11

n. s.

Landes, op. cit., p. 150.
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occasio nally borrowin g one another 's workmen."

Other observe rs

place heavy emphasis on the role of widespr ead general educatio n which
provided for a measure of technic al literacy at lower skill levels- 
and for substan tial empiric al problem -solving capacity at higher
levels.

Even if most technolo gy was borrowe d and even if there was

no first-ra te scientif ic establis hment in evidenc e, Rosenberg observe s
that the U. S. was "highly discrim inating in borrowin g patterns and
highly selectiv e in the uses to which imported technolo gies were put."
Clearly , the mechani cal skills and ingenui ty required for th.is task
were conside rable.

And while the U. S. produce d little in the way of

contribu tions to frontier science until much later, the diffusio n
of labor-sa ving technolo gy change and adaptati ons,from firearms

to

clocks, to watches , to harveste rs and to typewri ters, all part
of the "Americ an system~• required enginee rs who had at least a
groundin g in science and its use, even if they were not active
contrib utors to it.
Little wonder that the 19th century United States attitude
towards science and technolo gy has often been called extreme ly
pragmat ic.

While higher risk basic science was neglecte d, technolo gy

was borrowe d and improved upon.

The continu ing shortage of labor

resulted in continu ing labor-sa ving technolo gy bias.

Only.ag ricultur e

was, to some extent, an exceptio n; with private risks larger, so was
the role of governm ent.

The unique institut ional framework focussed

on the land grant college system was able to generate substan tial
technolo gy change tied to progres s in the chemist ry-relat ed agricul tural

-21sciences and diffused widely after the turn of the century.
Nineteenth century United States may thus be characterizedas a
frontier society disposing over what seemed like unlimited natural
resources, including fuel, and therefore, unlike Germany, not much
inclined to invest heavily in basic science.

Nevertheless, innovative

activity, based largely on imported technology and assisted by public
sector action, especially in education and agricultural research and
extension, proceeded at a very rapid pace, associated with rapid
increases in per capita income.

If we accept the notion, previously

put forward, that all technology is likely to be, directly or
indirectly, science-based, it is nevertheless true that this divergence
of the historical paths taken by the two early followers, Germany
and the United States, is most instructive.

It tells us that a

combination of differential endowments and policies may lead one
country to participate in growth via basic science and science
intensive industries, another by borrowing technology and using
a broadly-based scientific literacy to improve upon and diffuse
such technology.

III.

The Late Followers:

Hungary. and Japan

Turning our attention to the two successful late-followers in
our sample of historical country cases, Hungary and Japan, we ma:y
note, that, in terms of initial endowment and international "oppor~
tunities," the gap between them and the early arrivals was .
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substantial, probably as substantial as that between the late followers
and today's LDC's.
Hungary, for example, had a considerable disadvantage in terms
of human and natural resource endowment relative to Britain, Germany
or the United States.

While she shared with thenr a common European

cultural heritage, she was not, in fact, a full member of the elite
inner circle of scientific / industrial exchanges via trade, migration,
profes~ional meetings, industrial exhibitions, etc., all of which had
such an active life in Western Europe, especially after the middle of
the nineteenth century.

When to this is added the effects of 150 years

of Turkish occupation, frequent wars and the strong grip of feudalism,
we should not be surprised that the transition to modern growth was
delayed by at least half a century.
As Szant6, Vas-Zoltan and Cst5ndes put it, Hungary experienced
a "second edition" of serfdom between the 16th and 18th centuries,
while Western Europe was undergoing a major transition into mature
growth, combining a free labor·force and nationalistic governments
to build, first conunercial and overhead, later the basic fixed indus
trial capital structure required.

But perhaps Hungary's biggest handi

cap was that there was littfe possibility for an agricultural revolu
tion preceding (and fuelling) the industrial revolution to follow; and
when the possibilities for "catching up" :finally existed, Hungary was
assigned a position within the Habsburg Empire which did not permit
them to be adequately pursued.

The quasi-colonial division of labor

under the Austro-Hungaria n regime called for Austria, Bohemia and

-23Moravia to provide the industria l base, with Hungary assigned to a
largely agricultu ral role.

While this might have been an appropria te

static role initially , this colonial assignati on of resource alloca
tion deprived Hungary of a chance to move gradually into industria l
activitie s of comparati ve advantage until much later.
The Hungarian paper reports that in the middle of the seventeen th
century, only one universit y was in existence , in an area not under
Turkish rule.

By the end of the 19th century, a number of universit ies

and institute s had been establish ed, making their contribut ion to both
science and technolog y.

However, in spite of increasin g state support

to redress the balance within the Empire after 1867, via subsidies ,
improved condition s for attractin g foreign capital, and enhanced support
for scientiti c agricultu re (in the inter-war period), continued political
instabili ty handicapp ed Hungary's developme nt until virtually World
War II.
Since then, under the socialist mode of organizat ion, a substantial effort has·been made ~o "catch up," mainly by the extensive
use of R & D allocatio ns.

The latter have increased at a more rapid

rate than GNP and are now reported at 3% of GNP, one of the highest
on record.

But as Szanto, Vas-Zolta n and Csondes acknowled ge, in

spite of the 1968 reforms which, inter alia, served to encourage R

&

D

by making it chargeabl e as a current cost, as yet "the incentive s of
productio n ••• do not seem to give adequate encourage ment to the assimilat ion
of newly developed technolog ies."
Japan represent s the ease of a small late-come r country
which can today even more definitiv ely be labelled mature.

Like

-24Hungary , Japan before the Restora tion in 1868 may be consider ed
feudal and poor, although it had the definite advantag e of not having
been subjecte d to colonial ism and of having experien ced substan tial
developm ent of her interna l markets and of her agricul tural and human
infrastr ucture during the Tokugawa period.

While her "initia l condi

tionsll may thus be conside red favorab le relative to most contemp orary
LDC's, her success ful transiti on to modern growth from initial
endowments substan tially closer to those of LDC's than those of Western
Europe or the_U.S. has aroused unusual ly strong interes t among develop 
ment analysts and policy makers.
Most observe rs, includin g Nakayama, have detected the existenc e
of importa nt sub-pha ses in Japan's transiti on, during which the rela
tionship s among science , technolo gy and growth underwe nt conside rable
change.

Partly because of the extra-t erritori ality treaties imposed

by the West and partly because of the long seclusio n period pre-dati ng
the Restora tion, Japan's initi~l efforts to support her industr ializati on
drive via governm ent interven tion--w hat we would call import substitu tion
today~~ represen ted a relative ly mild version .
also reports ;

YB

Neverth eless, as Nakayama

do encount er, between 1868 and roughly 1890, determin ed

goverme nt efforts to "catch up with the West".

With protecti ve tariffs

largely unavail able, governm ent interven tion took the form of public
sectpr particip ation in di,rectly product ive activiti es, subsidie s and
other ways of influenc ing relative ·factor and product prices.
The Meiji governm ent initiall y encourag ed the large-sc ale borrow
ing of technolo gy.from abroad for both the agricul tural and non-
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As Nakayama points out, substantital errors

were connnitted by attempting to apply Western-style, land-abundant
agricultural methods--mainly developed for wheat--to a small-scale,
land-scarce rice economy.

Similar errors were connnitted in industry

by importing inappropriate "turn-key" technology for use in public
sector plants, some of which subsequently failed.

Both the advice

of the large numbers of foreign experts which were invited and the
findings of the even larger numbers of Japanese sent abroad to
reconnoiter as to the "right" country from which to borrow were
frequently wide of the mark during this period.
While these facts have often been lost sight of by overly
enthusiastic observers of the Japanese experience, it is perhaps more
instructive to note that it took the Japanese relatively little time
to recognize not only that imported technology had to be selected
carefully, in the first instance, but also that, ·for maximum effec
tiveness, it had to be substantially adapted to local conditions.
In agriculture, for example, (except for the northern island of
Hokkaido which had an atypical, almost U.S.~like, factor endowment)
attention had shifted completely by the early 1880's from labor
saving (mechanization-oriente d) Western methods to the diffusion of
land-saving (fertilizer and cultivation practice oriented) technology
using

the

experienced or "Veteran Farmers", supported by government

demonstration farm and extension efforts. 12
12

In industry, trial and

Hayami and Yamada ("Technological Progress in Agriculture,11
in Klein and Ohkawa, eds., Economic Growth: The Ja anese Ex erience
Since the Meiji Era, _Irwin, 1968 have demonstrated that the diffusion
to all parts of Japan, of the best-known agricultural practices of the
day accounted for most of the (substantial) growth of agricultural
productivity during this period.
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error led to greate r relianc e on private sector decisio ns as to
approp riate technol ogy choice .

In 1885, Nakayama report s, the Ministr y

of Techno logy was dissolv ed--an d the gradua l withdra wal (by sale to the
privat e sector ) of the governm ent from all but some heavy indust ries
was more or less comple ted by 1890.
The Japane se case has often been cited in suppor t of the notion
that a country can stay out of high-r isk science and concen trate instead
on lower- risk technol ogy import s. The Meiji governm ent spent relativ ely
little effort or resourc es on the advance ment of pure science . Yet the
quick
empiri cally-b ased respons e of Japane se engine ers and indust rialist s would
not have been possib le withou t a strong and well dispers ed educat ional
base, both genera l and techni cal, which had been part of the Japane se
scene from the beginn ing.

To borrow wisely and to adapt, with an eye

to differe nces in both the endowment and demand pattern s, require s, as
Nakayama points out, interm ediate- level scient ific manpow er, not "big
science " or heavy R
efforts to avoid. 13

&

D expend itures which the Japane se genera lly made

In this s~nse, we may detect a strong parall el

with the 19th century U.S. case:

pragma tic borrow ing of techno logy.

· from abroad , plus extens ive indigen ous technol ogy change suppor ted by
high, well-d istribu ted levels of scient ific and technic al literac y.
Nakayama notes that the early public sector 's import -intens ive
indust rializa tion efforts were domina ted by ex-sam urai who had been
displac ed by the aboliti on of feudal rights .

It is equally interes ting

to observ e that many of the medium - and small- scale private entrepr eneurs
13

Except , appare ntly, when the custom er was the miltta ry.
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who later helped shift the center of gravity to indigenous technological
experiementation and adaptation came from the ronin or lower (and less
well-connected) strata of samurai.
Production increases based on the diffusion of the "best" known
agricultural technology naturally ran out of steam after some time,
and,as Nakayama reports, chemical science""'intensive agricultural inno
vations became increasingly important after 1885.

The trend quickly

spread to the agricultural° input industries, e.g., tools, seeds, ferti
lizer, with substantial science-intensive (mostly Germany-oriented)
technology change in evidence.

This was also the time when government

support of industry in general, as we have seen, became more indirect
than direct and, incidentally, more export-oriented (and thus of
necessity more competitive) than during the import substitution period.
With respect to industrial technology, the need to compete in
international markets for silk, cotton yarn, textiles and, later,
rubber and electrical goods, provided an added impetus to the search
for additional innovations and.adaptations intensive in the relatively
abundant unskilled labor force.

14 Nakayama cites
the rather remarkable

increase in patent applications during this period, the large majority
.of which were process- rather than product-related.

A piece of inter-

esting historical evidence which has come to this author's attention
is the switch from mule to ring spindles in the Japanese cotton spinning
industry in 1887.

14

Rings, it turned out, could acconnnodate much

See the author's "Factor Proportions in Japanese Economic
Development," American Ecoiioniic·Review, September 1957.
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variety of yarn quality and could accommodate greate r variati ons
in the quality of the raw cotton input.

What is most interes ting

for our purpose s is the almost instant aneous switch of all cotton
textile mills in Japan while Indian textile mills, supplie d at
the time mainly by the same capita l export er (Flatt 's of London ),
and facing an even more extrem e surplus of unskill ed labor,
substa ntially stayed with the less efficie nt mule techno logy.
Some observ ers would place the approx imate date of Japan' s succes s
ful transit ion into modern growth shortly after World War I, others ,
after World Way II. 15 What is more import ant for our purpos es, howeve
r,
in that in Japan, as in the U.S., technol ogy and indust ry became more
directl y science -based or scienc e-inten sive in the inter-w ar period , with
basic
science s receivi ng major attenti on for the first time, as reflect ed in
the
growth of public and private researc h labs, the rise of sponso red
researc h and univer sity scienc e departm ents, and the growin g demands
of the militar y.

Nakayama consid ers the creatio n of Riken (the Insti-

tute for Physic al and Chemic al Resear ch) in 1917 ·-to be a· landma rk, with
85% of the funds coming from indust ry rather than governm ent.

Anothe r

was the creatio n in 1931 of the Japan Founda tion for the Promot ion of
Scienc e.

At the s.ame time, Japan, which had never really opened its

15 See , for exampl e, Fei
and Ranis, Develop ment of the Labor
Surplu s Econo!11Y: Theory and Policy , Irwin, 1964, and R. Minami, The Turning
Point in Japane se Economic Develo pment, Tokyo Univ. Press, 1970.
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doors to direct foreign private investment ~6 now experienced a new
wave of foreign technology inflow embodied in joint venture or licensing

arrangements (e.g., the G.E./Shibaura alliance, responded to by the
agreement between Westinghouse and Mitsubishi). Also an increasing
number of indigenous innovations, beginning with the Toyoda
loom. but moving into chemistry and later to electronics and related fields, began to make their appearance.

Clearly, as in Germany

at an earlier date, science had become increasingly viewed as an essen
tial national instrument, especially in countries such as Japan, short
of natural resources, and thus increasingly dependent, once labor
surplus had become exhausted, on the ingenuity and resourcefulness of
their people.
V.

The Developing Countries:

Brazil and Ghana

Brazil and Ghana are the two developing countries represented in
our study.

As is so frequently the case when anyone attempts to

generalize about''the" developing world, these two systems clearly have
as many differences between them as they do with respect to a "typical"
developed economy.

While it might be useful to deal with our two

cases within the context of a systematic typological framework which
differentiates among LDC families, for example,by size, land/labor ratios
and/or human resource endowment, this would take us beyond the limits of
16

The minor flows in the 19th century and the rather more substan
tial flows thereafter mainly took the fonn of loan capital. The absence
of any marked colonial pressure surely had its effects in precluding
the appearance of some of the more customary manifestations, of multi
national business interests.
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time and space of the present paper.

We will therefore attempt to

draw what reasonabl e generaliz ations seem to emerge concernin g the
relations hips among science, technolog y and developme nt in the LDC
case, and content ourselves with an occasion al comment concernin g
relevant intra-LDC differenc es.
Both Brazil and Ghana begin as colonial

entities, with

much of the observed pattern of resource allocatio n and growth
dictated by the needs of that system.

Pastore and Ayensu report

on the almost exclusive public sector emphasis of science during
this period and the concentra tion on flora, fauna and geologica l
.- -~
surveys-- mainly aimed at the location and exploitat ion of primary
raw materials .

It was gold, then mainly cotton, sugar and coffee

in Brazil; gold, then cocoa, in Ghana.

But the patterns were the same.

In both cases we witness not only a neglect of industry- -in fact, some
destructi on of artisan productio n by industria l imports-- but also of
food-prod ucing domestic ally-orien ted agricultu re. 17

And in both cases

the concern with the exportabl e cash crop is supplemen ted mainly by an
.

.

.

.

interest in health, and the required adaptatio n of medical science to
the overseas territory .

Colonial governme nts thus clearly recognize d

that some indigenou s scientifi c capacity was required in agricultu re
and health where local condition s with respect to soil, climate and
disease potential s are likely to vary substant ially.

l l This, incidenta lly, different iates the Japanese colonial system,
e.g., in Korea and Taiwan, from others. But that is because,.. once
domestic Japanese agricultu re ran out of 'steam early in this century,
it was food which the mother country wanted from her colonies in this
case.
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Political independence, of course, came much earlier to Brazil,
which emerged from its'!Iberian period" in the early 19th century, than
to Ghana which did not become independent of England until the 1950's.
Nevertheless, as Pastore is at pains to point out, political independence did not alter the basic triangular colonial pattern of resource
flows in Brazil until the 1930's.

Both systems, Brazil's in response to

the international vagaries of the Great Depression, Ghana's in pursuit
of domestically-o riented national development goals under Nkrumah,
embarked on a fairly standard type of import-substitu tion industriali
zation strategy.

Abstracting from the differences in the sizes of the

two domestic markets, the sheer volume of natural resources available,
the extent of regional diversity and the educational base achieved,
import substitution in both cases meant a rather determined effort to
import advanced coW1try industrial technology without much emphasis on
indigenous science, on the one hand, or technology adaptation, on the other,

and with a continuation-- if now for somewhat different reasons--of the
policy of relative neglect of food producing domestic agriculture.

Since the agricultural hinterland remains the large and crucial sector in most LDC' s, whe_ther measured in terms of people, output, or the
potential for the application of science-based technology, this contin
uation of colonial neglect under independent national governments is
of great concern.

Rice and maize research in Ghana received as scant

attention as beans and rice in Brazil.

Cocoa and coffee, on the

other hand, continued to be viewed as the major source of fuel
for the operation of the system and thus received most of the

-32-

attention of _agricultu ral research concerned with variety improvem ents,
new fertilize r combinati ons, resistanc e to plant disease, etc. Pastore
records some recent changes in Brazil in this respect; the situation is
less clear in Ghana--c ertainly the institutio n of the state farm system
there did not encourage cultivato r pressure or receptivi ty.
With respect to industry, Pastore finds not only Brazilian technology but the entire pattern of growth still heavily influence d by
foreigne rs--if now via the multi-na tional corporati on--even during the
import substitut ion sub-phase of developm ent.

He notes that "domestic

technolog ical and scientifi c establish ments were not encourage d to
innovate, " and that a surprisin g 62% of industria l know-how still emanates
from abroad, with half of large-sca le Brazilian firms holding permanent
foreign technical contracts . Science, until quite recently, apparent ly re
mained a highly individu alistic Europe-o riented art form. The first science or
technolog y oriented Universit y level training programs did not begin until
the 1930 1 s, and then with a still expressly abstract slant.

It should

not surprise us that the porti9n of Brazilian output growth not attri
butable to incJ:'8ases in physical inputs--w hich, with all its shortcomings, is called''tec hnology change"-- has been measured in the vicinity
of 20%, as opposed to 40%

to

80% for the advanced countries .

Pastore is

undoubted ly correct in concludin g that the developme nt of science cannot
be left to laissez faire forces if the requisite critical mass of human
and physical resources is to become available .
On the other hand, we note that heavy governmen t intervent ion in science

I.
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(and technology)--which certainly was the situation in Ghana during the
Nkrumah period--by no means guarantees a more favorable outcome.
Ayensu is kinder than this observer in his evaluation of the long~term
developmental impact of Nkrumah's Science City, the Volta River project,
and other large-scale government efforts aimed at forcing Ghana into
modernity, without the benefits of a fully socialist institutional
structure.

He nevertheless recognizes that. the increasingly heavy

government participation in directly productive activities during the
First and Second Plans could not solve (I would say probably worsened)
the middle-level management capacity shortage in the country.
there should be little surprise, given Ayensu's own figures

In fact,
of only

1.4% of school-going males and .7% of school-going females getting even
a modest technical or commercial education,

that the Ghana

Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) has performed as
badly as he reports.
Even where the effort is less extreme, and the economy remains more
"mixed," there seems to be ample evidence that "in general, import
substitution policy and full-scale protection of consumer goods industry
have tended to promote a passive attitude to the utilization and develop
ment of indigenous R
development. nlS

&

D efforts, during the early phase of industrial

The distortions affecting output c3.nd. technology choice,

both in terms of relative prices and lack of competitive pressures, in

18Nam Kee Lee, "Technological Development
and the Role of R & D
Institutes in Developing Countries," I.L.O. Working Paper, p. 19.
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choices, are well known.

The relevant issue rather is how severe are

the import substitut ion policies and for how long are they maintaine d?
For, while it is generally acknowledged that they have a valid and
important role to play in the early post~colo nial life of an LDC still
lacking in industria l entrepren eurial capacity, the fact is that they
as often convert themselve s into ballast which is later political ly
difficult to discard.

While Ghana remains in the fairly early stages

of non-durab le consumer goods (primary) lmport substitut ion,. it is,
we believe, accurate to say that Brazil, except for a brief 1963-68 ·
interlude , has intensifi ed her import substitut ion policies, moving
into the technical ly more complicat ed (secondar y import substitut ion)
industrie s,, i.e., durable conswner goods, capital goods and raw material
processin g.

Such a shift, if anything, is yet more dependent on foreign

technolog y and yet more dissociat ed from domestic scientifi c or adaptive
technolog ical ingenuity .

We agree with Pastore that "a strong scientifi c

establishm ent is necessary in ~rder to m1derstan d trans-nat ional know
ledge, both in science and technolog y."

We would only add that the

dimension of"stren gth" involved includes the capacity to choose, and to
reject, to adapt and to diffuse; the contrast in performan ce between a
relativel y small natural resources poor island nation, Japan, which proceeded to turn outward after a period of relativel y mild import substitut ion,
and large, natural resources abundant Brazil, is bound to be instructi ve
in these ~espects~
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VI.

~iridirigs arid Conclusions
In these last few pages we will attempt to record some of the

findings and insights that seem to have emerged with respect to the
many complicated questions raised-focussing mainly on those facets
of historical experience which may serve to illuminate basic contem
porary developing country concerns.

These are personal conclusions

drawn from the seven country papers as well as other sources and-
just as the rest of this effort--do not implicate the individual
authors in any way.

Almost all countries today accept the importance

of the impact of technology on growth--as well as on distribution
and other important dimensions of development.

But they are pro

foundly uneasy as to how much of their technology can be, or should
be, home-grown, imported and/or imported and adapted.

They are even

more uneasy with respect to the volume of resources and energy they
should commit to basic science as the underpinning for technology
change.

Waiving other motivations and considerations, in other words,

they are concerned about the price of the "ticket of admission" to
the community of science.
Our analysis of the role of science and technology in the history
of the now developed countries led us to conclude that to divide tech
nology into empirically-based and science-based categories is likely
to be off the mark.

Epochal technological change of the type we have

become accustomed to in the 20th century is lik~ly to be more directly
related to major scientific breakthroughs than irt the past.

We need only
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think of electronics , plastics, the computer, atomic energy, .to make
•
19
.
the point.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, on the other hand, the
pace of science was slower--som e would say "big science" had not as
yet arrived--an d consequentl y any epochal technology change such as
the steam engine, equally based on a major scientific discovery, might
yield its technologic al impacts and application s over a longer
period and in more diffuse ways.

This does not make the sum of such

innovations less science-bas ed, but rather less science-int ensive.
Second, keeping the United States and Japanese experiences
particularl y in mind, these systems were admittedly not pioneers in
frontier science; but they developed a definite capacity to absorb
science as a necessary basis for their own very substantial achieve
ments in importing and adapting technology. As Kuznets has pointed
out, 20 this capacity to use science wisely is more likely to be national
rather than supra-natio nal.

But it does not just happen• It is related

to the educational system, to the national ethos, as well as to the
types of interventio ns, direct or indirect, practiced by governments .
An educational system which imparts a modicum of scientific under

standing to a substantial portion of the population, a pragmatic
"catch-up" philosophy which accompanies "late-comer "

19
As a recent OECD study (The Conditions for Success in-Techno
logical Innovation, OECD, Paris, 1971) noted: "Technolog ical innova
tion·is as old as man, but it is only in the 20th century that science,
technology and industrial firms have come together to play such an
important role in it."
20
In private corresponde nce with the author.
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status, and national governments' willingness to move away from
dirigiste mercantilist interventions can provide basic building
blocks for this type of science capacity at a relatively early stage
of a country's development.

As the experience of both Japan and

(especially) the U. S. also illustrates, the same country may later,
in its modern growth phase, acquire the capacity to advance the
international frontiers of science.
The "typical" contemporary LDC thus cannot afford to "sit back"
and let the advanced countries incur all the expenditures attached to
the trials and errors of international science--espec ially not n0~·in the
twentieth century when the pace of science has much accelerated and
the gap between it and technology narrowed.

Yet it cannot afford, and

should not try, to "show the flag" in every field of basic scientific
endeavor; the less developed world is strewn with scientific institutes
and other expensive white elephants which contribute neither to science
nor to technology.

Most observers agree that the biggest waste

of all is second-rate basic research.

The "middle road" points in the

direction of a broad enough spread of science and technical education
and a flexible enough economic environment to permit both appropriate
scientific and technological choices as well as indigenous improvements
and adaptations.

International science is only slightly more a "free

good" than technology; there are important search, identificat ion,
transfer and assimilatio n costs involved.
Julian Engel sees "little justificatio n [in LDC's] for basic
research except for sustaining a viable teaching effort and keeping
your best brains at home."

This is in general accord with our above

position except that it may go too far.

There are fields of scientific

endeavor which must be strongly represented within the LDC's because
of their country- or region-spec ific character.
examples are in agriculture and health.

The best

Without basic agricultura l

science-ori ented research on a country or at least regional basis, the
recent chemistry and Mendelian law-based innovations which have gone
under the name of the Green Revolution do not, as we are now finding
out, have the necessary sustaining power and the necessary defense
against specific local (e.g., pest and disease) problems.

Similarly, in the

field of health, few people would argue that one trans-natio nal science
can really be equally responsive to the very differentia ted conditions
around the globe.

It is in such areas that the "puzzle"-so lving capacity

of science in response to technologic al problems clearly requires a f.irst
rate scientific establishme nt.
Are there other areas in which the same criteria apply?
perhaps the most difficult question of all.
human activity is affected,

This is

In one sense, all

to a larger or smaller extent, by the

particular soil, climate and other conditions under which it is
carried out.

It is, for example, relevant even in industry--t hink of the

relationshi p of fertilizer and agricultura l implements to the conditions of
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the soil, and of the importance of humidity and temperature conditions-
as well as natural fiber quality--to spinning and weaving operations.
Where then does the need for individual LDC basic research end-~and the
caveats against a wasteful buck-shot approach take hold?
This is by no means an easy matter on which to pontificate in an
abstract way.

This observer would insist, nevertheless, that the

burden of proof be on those who would like to initiate advanced uni
versity training and basic research, including some obligation to
demonstrate a flexible, time-phased relevance to technology changes-
which, in turn, can be expected to affect the productive system.

This

may seem like the typical hard-headed, narrow economist's prescription.
What about the importance of those many possible chance inter-connections,
decades apart, which may flow, in some entirely unpredictable
from what looks like some unconnected.intellectual pursuit?

way,

Without

disparaging these possibilities in any way, we would respond--if we
are indeed offended by the spectacle of open heart research in countries
where malnutrition is a prevalent phenomenon--that science really
sh<;mld not expect to be entirely outside the realm of some flexible,
sophisticated version of cost-benefit analysis.

Such analysis must

try to balance the potential benefits against the possible alternative
allocations of scarce financial and {perhaps more important) human
resources.

The higher risks of science--partly due to the uncertainty

of predicting future two-way interactions between science and technology,
and partly to the likely inappropriability nationally of any such
"returns"--render this task unusually difficult.
be done; an act of faith does not suffice.

But analysis must still
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like to have LDC's purchas e the "price of admiss ion" in a given field
of basic scient ific endeav or, it m~ght be possib le--alth ough admitte dly
diffic ult--to encoura ge much more specia lizatio n, at least within ,and
possib ly also among LDC's on a region al basis.

This type of agreem ent

has been reached , for exampl e, in the case of Europea n atomic energy
and ballis tics researc h and African effort s.to combat yellow fever
and rinder pest, i.e. , where the require d scale and the need to avoid
expens ive duplic ation were suffic ient to overcome nation alistic
jealou sies.

Althoug h the record on simila r inter-LD C agreem ents in

the field of common market investm ent alloca tions, etc. , has not been
terribl y encour aging, it has been somewhat better with respec t to the
use of region al trainin g institu tes and researc h organi zations -- whenev er
~egion alism is not forced but flows from the recogn ition of mutual
self-in terest.
If we agree that no country can really afford to be either a
full-tim e borrow er of science or an across -the-bo ard contrib utor to it-
what about technol ogy?

First of all, our histor ical forays seem to

clearly indica te suppor t for the Bemal- Kuznet s positio n that tech
nology gives rise to as many leading "puzzl es" require d for furthe r
scient ific progre ss as the other way around .

Conseq uently, much of

what we had to say above applies to technol ogy as well.

When we are

speakin g about a societ y's nation al capaci ty to-util ize and modify
intern ationa l science creativ ely, we are also referri ng to a kindred
capaci ty to s•lect approp riate technol ogy and adapt it to differi ng
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If we but keep in mind that contribut ions to human

knowledge which_bre ak new ground and provide scope for major new
technolog ical breakthro ughs will, with few exception s, remain the
· province of the leading mature countries , what can we say about the
direction

new science-i ntensive and engineeri ng-intens ive technolog y

change is likely to take?
The two elements which seem most responsib le for this
direction are·chang ing resource endowments and public policy.

The

very different behavior of the natural-r esources -rich labor-sca rce
United States relative to a relativel y capital-s carce England and a
Germany which felt cramped for natural resources should be instructive in this respect.

Engineer ing-inten sive technolog y took a differen t,

more capital-in tensive path in the wide open spaces of the U.S. than
in England.

And, in Germany, metallurg ical science responded to the

needs of a high phosphori c iron ore content~ official encourage ment
of the entire chemical industry was based on the felt need to overcome,
by artificia l or synthetic short-cut s, the relative unkindnes s of
nature.

Japan, after first exploring her abundant labor resources -

and taking an engineeri ng-intens ive route analogous to that of
the U.S., but capital-s aving--ha s, with the disappear ance of that
labor surplus, tended to place more of her eggs in electroni cs and
other high technolog y baskets.
But,as has also been pointed out, while governmen t policies
cannot legislate away the basic endowment of a society, they can,
if flexible and able to overcome narrow sectio.nal interests ,
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oping economy as its endowment changes with time.

Analogously ,

if dominated by narrow vested interests and/or lacking

in historical perspective , such policies can attempt to draw a veil
over the endowment and lead the system into expensive scientific/
technologic al dead-ends and economic stagnation.

While there is no

rigid uni-directi onal sequence of phases which every LDC must somehow
traverse on the path to mature growth, some attention to the changing
roles of science and technology
in
terms of a changing resource endowo
.
ment and, especially, changing human capacities is essential in all but
t he most unusual cases. 21
At the micro and institution -building level, the appropriate role
of government in the mixed economy context is, of course, not unrelated
to the appropriab ility or non-approp riability of the new knowledge
0

acquired.

Investment in basic science carries a high risk, in part

because of its, at best, indirect and long-term relationshi p
with technology and growth, but·partly also because it is generally
an internation al good not even appropriabl e by a country, not to speak
of any private party within the country. As we move from basic inter-

national science to changes in technology, risks are reduced and private
appropriab ility becomes much more important.

As the extent of appropri

ability rises, so, nonnally, does the level of private R & D expenditure s.
21

A country like Kuwait, for example, may be able to buy its way into
the charmed circle with turn-key oil-oriente d technology but, even there,
there is some doubt as to whether it qualifies as a mature economy.
It certainly does not meet all the Kuznetsian stylized attributes of
a system under modern growth.
·

I.

. L.
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research effort but also on the overall state of competitiveness or
non-competitive ness of the system.

This is partly a function of the

overall policy environment; for example, during periods of intense
import substituting industrial protection and large unearned profits,
there would seem to be less interest on the part of industrialists to
search for the best technology; instead, satisficing behavior and the
use of inappropriate (often prestige) technology seems to frequently
22
• l ace maximizing
- • • •
b e h avior.
.
d isp

But, for any given industry or sector,

the state of competitiveness also depends on conditions peculiar to
the particular market, with respect to goods, information or technology.
Agriculture, for example, is typically the most competitive field,
therefore exhibiting the least private appropriability possibilities
and the least willingness (or capacity) by individual farmers to
incur R & D expenditures.

Consequently, not only basic scientific

agricultural research but also the search for appropriate adaptive
technology and even its dissemination to individual farmers usually
represents activities (and costs) which fall to the public sector.
Ditto for health--except perhaps even more so.
recognized.

This

is

fairly well

But what is perhaps less well understood is the fact that

there exist other industries--aga in on a continuum moving through
agricultural processing and input industries to light cons\Dller goods,
sane services, and beyond--where similar characteristics abound, i.e.,
22

For more on this, see the author's "Appropriate Technology in
the Dual Economy: Reflections on Philippine and Taiwanese Experience,"
International Economic Association, 1976.
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and thus the need for possible governmen t involveme nt in R & D, education
and extension .

If, in the absence of pronounce d market imperfect ions,

new technolog y can be selective ly borrowed from abroad, the burden on
high cost domestic R & Dis reduced and a miniml.llll of governmen t support
can lead to rapid diffusion of technolog y change.
case for Japan.

This certainly was the

Here the profound technolog y change associate d with the

switch from mule to ring cotton spindling in the late nineteeth century was
diffused as rapidly as the agricultu ral practices of the "Veteran Farmers."
Whether or not, in mature market economies , competiti ve
or non-comp etitive industria l configura tions yield relativel y more
private R & D activity remains an as yet unresolve d empirical issue.
Competiti ve industrie s have more incentive but less capacity.

With

respect ~o the LDC's, it seems to us, any viable science and technolog y
policy must begin with an examinati on of the extent of the overall
competiti ve pressures felt by individua l decision-m akers with respect
to economic versus engineeri ng ·choices •

It

must include sensitivi ty

to differenc es in the market structure s of specific industrie s, and
considera 't:ion of selective governmen t action in creating social over
heads in the science and technolog y arena.

Such intervent ions

may be addressed to ensuring that existing technolog ical alternati ves
are known to all sizes of firms, or to helping expand the range of
alternati ves via the support of universit y or R & D institute activity.
In either case it is, however, important to ensure not only that the
areas of activity are selected with some of the (flexible ) cost/bene fit
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specific activities supported within these fields carry built-in
devices to ensure that the criteria of ultimate contributions to
social and economic development and not any exclusively internal
criteria of the "invisible college" are addressed.

One such device,

frequently referred to, is that government subsidy of R & D institutes
be set on a long-term declining basis, with private sector contracts
forced to fill the widening gap.

Another is to·concentrate scarce

attention on the more competitive "non-appropriable" sectors and, in
fact, to ensure that access to information as well as to the required
complementary inputs is relatively equal across firms.
One dimension of this general problem which has been mentioned only
fleetingly thus far is that of process versus product innovation.
Economists, as this paper well demonstrates, spend most of their time
discussing technique or process change while industrialists and R & D
allocators spend most of their energies and resources on product change.
When technology change is of the cataclysmic or epochal·type, e.g., the
invention of the automobile based on the principle of combustion, it
is more of a semantic issue whether we call this a change in the trans
portation process or a change in product (from·the horse and buggy);
but when we are dealing·with more common sequential and adaptive
innovations, the distinction may be more real and related to the com
petitiveness of markets.

It seems clear, for example, that product

differentiation is of greater importance in less competitive markets and
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If we

apply, if loosely (and briefly), the product cycle idea, it is clear
that patents and trademark s may represent one device to extend the
period of quasi-mon opoly position beyond what would be possible via
simple process and price considera tions.

The contrasti ng role in today's

LDC's, of the contempor ary Japanese multi-nat ional corporati on, which
is largely process and price oriented, and that of the U.S. multi
national which is largely product and quality oriented, is rather
startling in this regard.

It is no accident that the distribut ion of

domestic patents as between process and product innovatio ns today is
overwhelm ingly in favor of process in Japan and of product in the U. S.
In an earlier day the U.S. was process oriented relative to the product
orientati on of the U.K.
product innovatio n.

In recent years, Japan is itself shifting towards

It thus appears, ceteris paribus, that the richer

and more scale-dom inated the mature economy becomes, the more important
is the relative role of product innovatio ns.
0

This question of competiti veness is, of course, of importanc e for
the developin g economy subject to the blandishm ents of domestic as well
as. foreign technolog y salesmen, with respect to both process and product.
Schmookle r long aso pointed to the importanc e of demand factors in
technolog y change.- Whether the change in product quality is real or
1magined, carries additiona l real benefits or not, is another question.
The fact is that the absence of competiti ve pressures and adequate
informati on often do not give LDC consumers an unimpaire d choice, at
realistic relative prices.

Much of the (we believe quantitat ively

important ) misalloca tion of LDC resources on inapprop riate (e.g.,

-47overspecifi ed) goods as well as inappropria te technologie s is related
to the presence of proprietary and non-compet itive elements in areas
not warranted by the basic scale relative to the size of the market,
e.g. in soft drinks and drugs.

The evolution of modern appropriate

goods for local markets, at prices which reflect quality differentia ls,
is similar to the adaptive changes in processes arising from "blue
collar" R & D, practiced on the factory floor and in the machine shops,
as contrasted to the more visible "white collar" variety carried on in
corporate and university labs.

It is similarly linked to empirical

learning by doing and experimenti ng processes.

While some scientists,

some economists, and many engineers may well disdain to call both of
these related types of activity technology change--and may be especially
reluctant to admit of any relationshi p to science--we would argue not
only that they are important for LDC social and economic growth but
als·o that they are but one step removed from the mechanical or engineering
intensive innovations of 19th century labor surplus Japan, and two steps
from those of the 19th century labor scarce United S*ates.
It is, in summary, admittedly futile to attempt to manipulate basic
science in any particular direction; the relationshi ps and feed-backs
are much too diffuse and complicated .

But LDC's can, and we might add,

must, exercise restraint as to the fields in which they decide to
maintain a first-rate scientific establishme nt. They must make
a serious effort at reorienting their educational structures
towards the very ability to make these selections, i.e., via the
achievement of a broadly based scientific literacy which not only
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conveys the ability

to perceive where indigenous frontier capacity

should be installed but also guarantees the necessary access to the
internation al networks.
With respect to technology, the task of public policy is perhaps
easier, but by no means simple.

Internation ally, there exists a

substantial ly larger number of borrowing options by country and by
type than we used to believe, but many remain obscured by a lack of
information and other institution al impediments , some related to the
public and private capital transfer mechanism.

The options which exist,

in nature, with respect to indigenous or adaptive technology change,
new or derived, are much more numerous yet.

Govemments can do much

at the aggregative level to ensure that the veil between relative
prices and endowments which must sometimes be drawn is neither exces
sively thick or kept excessively long; governments can help ensure
that sufficient workable competition exists so that entrepreneu rs are
interested in finding the most appropriate technology in the first
place, rather than being in a position to indulge their preference
for prestige and the 'quiet life." And, perhaps .most important, as a
complement to these aggregative measures is the possible interventio n
of the public sector in institution al areas, in ensuring a freer flow
of information on market, quality and technology options and in providing
support to technical education and R & D, especially of the unspectacu lar
adaptive non-approp riable type.
The interaction s between science, technology and development are poten
tially of :very great benefit to the transition effort of the developing
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terms of its ability to rely on the contribution of more physical capital
and other conventional inputs.

But the opportunities of participating

within an interdependent global system will not be realized if national
policies are not more realistically geared to our gradually improving
understanding of the fundamental behavioral relationsnips involved.
It is hoped that the work of this Symposium has carried us a small
step forward in this direction.

